- Fixed indentation on int_pet.c (how did it got messed up?)

- Added mapflag "loadevent", now load-map script events will ONLY trigger on maps with this mapflag on, rather than every map.
- High Jump can now be used in all versus maps.
- Added Kaite's opt3 value, taken from jA
- Added state dirty == 2 to storages. Signals when a storage was sent for final saving. Said storage is removed from memory after the ack from the char-server, and they are sent to save if the map/char servers reconnect before the act arrives. In short: they are guaranteed to be saved after a char logs out.


git-svn-id: https://rathena.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/rathena/trunk@7358 54d463be-8e91-2dee-dedb-b68131a5f0ec

1 files changed, 10 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/src/map/clif.c b/src/map/clif.c
index e25b89a8f..1698045e2 100644
--- a/src/map/clif.c
+++ b/src/map/clif.c
@@ -8207,7 +8207,7 @@ void clif_parse_LoadEndAck(int fd,struct map_session_data *sd)
 		sc_start(&sd->bl,SC_NOCHAT,100,0,0);

 

 // Lance

-	if(sd->state.event_loadmap){

+	if(sd->state.event_loadmap && map[sd->bl.m].flag.loadevent){

 		pc_setregstr(sd, add_str("@maploaded$"), map[sd->bl.m].name);

 		npc_script_event(sd, NPCE_LOADMAP);

 	}

@@ -9848,8 +9848,6 @@ void clif_parse_NpcStringInput(int fd,struct map_session_data *sd)
 	if(message_len >= sizeof(sd->npc_str)){

 		ShowWarning("clif: input string too long !\n");

 		message_len = sizeof(sd->npc_str);

-	} else {

-		message_len += 1; // Null character

 	}

 

 	// Exploit prevention if crafted packets (without null) is being sent. [Lance]

@@ -9972,12 +9970,18 @@ void clif_parse_ResetChar(int fd, struct map_session_data *sd) {
  */

 void clif_parse_LGMmessage(int fd, struct map_session_data *sd) {

 	unsigned char buf[512];

-	int len = RFIFOREST(fd);

+//	int len = RFIFOREST(fd);

 	int plen = RFIFOW(fd,2);

 	RFIFOHEAD(fd);

 

-	if(plen <= 0 || plen > len) // Possible hack! [Lance]

-		plen = len;

+	//This shouldn't be needed.... because the parsing code makes sure

+	//this function is not invoked until enough bytes have been received.

+	//So if the client "hacks" the packet, all that will happen is that

+	//it will not be parsed until enough data is received, on which point

+	//the following packets will be offset, causing them to fail to parse,

+	//which leads to disconnecting them :3 [Skotlex]

+//	if(plen <= 0 || plen > len) // Possible hack! [Lance]

+//		plen = len;

 

 	if ((battle_config.atc_gmonly == 0 || pc_isGM(sd)) &&

 	    (pc_isGM(sd) >= get_atcommand_level(AtCommand_LocalBroadcast))) {